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"CONCERTED ACTIVITY" FOR FACEBOOK POSTS
DANIEL BEST*
I. INTRODUCTION
Employers beware. Actions against employees who post negative
comments on social media about their employer could violate federal law.
The National Labor Relations Board (Board or NLRB) will sanction
employers if an employee's Facebook comment was "concerted activity."
The Board will sanction businesses small and large. The National Labor
Relations Act (Act or NLRA) protects an employee's right to engage in
"concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection."' Section 8 of the Act prohibits, among other
things, employers from taking action against employees who engage in
section 7, "concerted activity." 2 As "concerted activity" is not defined in
the Act, its meaning changes according to the Board's discretion.
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' National Labor Relations Act § 7,29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
2 Id. § 8. These types of actions are known as "retaliation." The Act defines
retaliation as "taking action against an employee because the employee engaged in
some type of activity that is protected by law." Robin E. Shea, Employers, You
Might (or Might Not) Be Liable for Retaliation if. . . , EMP. & LAB. INSIDER (Jan.
27, 2012), http://www.employmentandlaborinsider.com/discrimination/our-friend-
judy-greenwald-from/. The three components of a retaliation claim are (1) "The
employee engages in some type of legally protected activity," (2) "Adverse
employment action is taken by the company," and (3) "There is a 'causal nexus'
. . . between the protected activity and the adverse action." Id.; see also Alchris
Corp., 301 N.L.R.B. 182, 182 (1991) (noting that the employer did not know the
concerted nature of the activity when terminating the employee).
3 The Board has the authority to define concerted activity. See NLRB v. J.
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 260 (1975); see also NLRB v. City Disposal Sys.,
Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 830 (1984) ("The term 'concerted activit[y]' is not defined in
the Act but it clearly enough embraces the activities of employees who have joined
together in order to achieve common goals." (citations omitted)); NLRB v. Enter.
Ass'n of Steam Local 638, 429 U.S. 507, 528 (1977) ("[C]ourts should defer to the
agency's understanding of the statute which it administers."); Associated Grocers
of New Eng., Inc. v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 1333, 1336 (1st Cir. 1977) ("The Board is
entitled to considerable deference in its determination of the scope of § 7 and its
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The meteoric rise of claims regarding the termination of employees
because of their Facebook posts--coined "Facebook Firings"-has caused
employers to struggle to find guidance regarding if and when they are able
to take action against their employees. Though the NLRB may adapt the
NLRA as needed,' there must be limitations in applying "old-law" to
Facebook posts. 6 Facebook posts can be concerted activity under some
circumstances. Currently, the Board grants the status of concerted activity
to Facebook posts based on the decisionmaker's subjective interpretation.
To highlight the issue with subjective interpretation, compare the
language of the following two Facebook posts. The first belongs to
Dawnmarie Souza, the plaintiff in American Medical Response of
Connecticut, who was discharged for several violations of American
Medical Response's employee standards of conduct.7 Her post read: "Looks
like I'm getting some time off. Love how the company allows a 17 [AMR
code for a psychiatric patient] to be a supervisor."8
application of the Act to the varying circumstances of industrial relations."
(citations omitted)).
4 See MICHAEL J. EASTMAN, A SURVEY OF SOCIAL MEDIA ISSUES BEFORE THE
NLRB 22 n.79, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Aug. 5, 2011). The Board has seen
an influx of social media cases; as of August 5, 2011, there have been a reported
129 cases that have involved social media in some way. Id. at 1.
See 1. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. at 266 ("The responsibility to adapt the Act to
changing patterns of industrial life is entrusted to the Board.").
6 Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1275, 1281 & n.24 (2002). The definition of "old-law," as Lee puts it, includes
"statutes or doctrines that were created before the Internet even existed and,
therefore, could not possibly have anticipated application to the Internet." Id. at
128 1; see also James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB's Uncertain
Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 221, 228 (2005) ("Congress, however, has
made no comprehensive changes in the NLRA since 1959. As a result of this
legislative inaction, the Board enjoys neither a renewed mandate nor additional
powers and responsibilities. Instead, it relies on an aging regulatory structure to
monitor and respond to labor relations realities that could scarcely have been
anticipated sixty or seventy years earlier." (footnote omitted)).
7 Advice Memorandum on American Medical Response of Connecticut, Case 34-
CA-12576 from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB Div. of Advice, to
Jonathan B. Kreisberg, Reg'1 Dir., Region 34, at 2 (Oct. 5, 2010) [hereinafter
American Medical Advice Memorandum].
Id. at 3.
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Compare that to an employee whose discipline was analyzed in the
Wal-Mart advice memorandum.9 The post stated:
You have no clue [Employee 1] . . . [Assistant Manager] is
being a super mega puta! Its retarded I get chewed out cuz
we got people putting stuff in the wrong spot and then the
customer wanting it for that price . . . that's false
advertisement if you don't sell it for that price . . . I'm
talking to [Store Manager] about this shit cuz if it don't
change walmart can kiss my royal white ass!'0
Though both posts make disparaging remarks without soliciting any
concerted action, the first was held to be concerted activity while the
second was not. Small and large business owners cannot rely on such
varying outcomes." To aid them, this comment proposes that the Board
adopt a contemporary, objective framework that can be used to determine if
an employee's Facebook post is concerted activity.1
Part II of this comment brings to the surface three prevalent factors in
determining if activity-in the physical world-is concerted. These three
factors serve as the basis for the suggested objective test. Part III discusses
what modifications need to be made to the factors for "Facebook Firing"
cases. Part IV takes four "Facebook Firing" cases and applies the test to the
facts of each case to highlight the inconsistency in the Board's current
approach.
9 Advice Memorandum on Wal-Mart, Case 17-CA-25030 from Barry J. Kearney,
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB Div. of Advice, to Daniel L. Hubbel, Reg'1 Dir.,
Region 17, at (July 19, 2011) [hereinafter Wal-Mart Advice Memorandum].
10 Id. (alteration in original).
1 The American Medical Response of Connecticut case will be analyzed under the
proposed objective framework. See infra Part IV.
12 There are many interconnected issues in a section 7 analysis that this comment
will not address; first, this comment will not address whether the concerted activity
is protected. For examples of the difference between concerted activity and
protected concerted activity, see Crown Cent. Petrol. Corp. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d
724, 729 (5th Cir. 1970). The scope of this comment will be limited to whether
interaction via social media is, in itself, concerted activity, not whether the
interaction occurs in a such way that forfeits protection. However, "[bjefore it can
be determined if a worker's actions are protected, the question must be answered
whether or not those actions are concerted." Linda Barnard, Individual Activities as
"Concerted" Actions, 53 UMKC L. REV. 495, 502 (1985); see also Nancy J. King,
Labor Law for Managers ofNon-Union Employees in Traditional and Cyber
Workplaces, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 827, 828 (2003) (noting the "two-prong requirement"
under section 7). Second, this comment will not address social media in the context
of "cyber labor law." Id. at 830 n.6. Cyber labor law focuses on the interaction of
the NLRA and the use of electronic technology in the workplace. Id.
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II. THREE IMPLIED, BUT KEY, FACTORS IN DETERMINING IF
ACTIVITIES OCCURRING IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD ARE CONCERTED
When determining if activity in the physical world is concerted, the
NLRB always considers three key factors-key factors that it has all but
ignored when deciding if communication via Facebook is concerted.'3 One
of the Board's responsibilities is to define concerted activity.14 Its decisions
have shown that if any of the three factors-though not expressly
mentioned by name-were not fulfilled, the activity was not concerted.
This Part sifts through the analysis of several decisions and highlights those
three key factors-which I coin as the "foundation requirement," the
"substantive requirement" and the "procedural requirement." Without any
one of these factors, the activity cannot be concerted.
A. Foundation Requirement
The first implied factor used to identify concerted activity is whether
there had been a clearly communicated concern to someone in power before
the employee engaged in the activity. Though this requirement is not
mentioned specifically by name, it is well established. The foundation
requirement can be inferred from past decisions because in each case, the
employer had been put on notice of a concern prior to an employee's
alleged concerted activity.15 Essentially, the foundation requirement serves
as an anchor. This anchor is necessary because retaliation for concerted
activity usually "destroy[s] the bud of employee initiative aimed at
bettering terms of employment and working conditions." 6 Therefore, it is
'3 See infra Part III.
14 NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984) ("We have often
reaffirmed that the task of defining the scope of § 7 is for the Board to perform in
the first instance as it considers the wide variety of cases that come before it, and,
on an issue that implicates its expertise in labor relations, a reasonable construction
by the Board is entitled to considerable deference." (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). It is worth noting that not all members of the Court
agreed with the majority in City Disposal Systems. The three dissenters-Justices
O'Connor, Powell and Rehnquist-disagreed with the majority for three reasons:
(1) it was not within the legislative authority of the Board; (2) the complaint was of
a personal nature; and (3) the original purpose of labor laws were "designed to
encourage employees to work together." Id. at 841-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting);
Barnard, supra note 12, at 497.
'5 See, e.g., Gold Coast Rest. Corp. v. NLRB, 995 F.2d 257, 263 (D.C. Cir.),
amended by No. 91-1533, 1993 WL 444597 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 25, 1993); Silchia v.
MCI Telecomm. Corp., 942 F. Supp. 1369, 1373 (D. Colo. 1996).
16 Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1347 (3d Cir. 1969). The case
also stated that "[t]he concerted activities involved were prompted by the
employer'sfailure ... to pay an employees' bonus, as had been done during a
number of preceding years." Id. at 1348-49 (emphasis added). The emphasized
2013 Callfor Consistency: A Proposed 5
Objective Framework for Defining
"Concerted Activity "for Facebook Posts
only logical that the employer be-at the very least-aware of the terms
that the employee seeks to improve. Regardless of whether the dispute was
about group activity or individual action concerning union activity, a
collective bargaining agreement or an ongoing dispute, the foundation
requirement is well established.
The foundation requirement is established when there was concerted
group activity and an ongoing dispute.17 In NLRB v. Washington Aluminum
Co., the employer was well aware of the concern upon which the
subsequent activity-a walkout-was based.18 In Washington Aluminum
Co., the employees complained periodically about frigid temperatures in a
machine shop.'9 Before the walkout-which was later held to be concerted
activity-the managers were well aware of the employees' complaints
regarding the inadequate heat: a working condition. 20 The foundation
requirement is met because the walkout was anchored to a complaint made
in the physical world that the managers were aware of before the concerted
activity took place.2 1
Additionally, the foundation requirement is established when individual
concerted activity was done based on the enforcement of a collective
bargaining agreement. In the landmark case NLRB v. City Disposal
Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court upheld the Interboro doctrine.22 In City
Disposal, James Brown, an employee, complained that the brakes on his
language suggests that the employer was aware of why the employees engaged in
concerted activity.
17 Ongoing disputes are the third category of concerted activity. They cover
situations where the employee is not involved in union activity or enforcing a
collective bargaining agreement. Typically, this situation surrounds a workplace
issue-like having no heat in the working environment. See NLRB v. Wash.
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 10 (1962).
18 Id. at 10-13 (stating that employees "complained from time to time" and
"'huddled' together" because of the cold).
'
9 Id. at 10.
20 Id. at 11. In deciding that the activity was concerted-before the Supreme Court
did-the Board noted that the testimonies of the employees showed that there were
previous complaints made before the walkout. Id. at n.4.
Id. at 12 (referring to when Jarvis, the shop foreman, informed the general
foreman that all but one employee had left because of the temperatures in the
shop).
22 NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 841 (1984). The Interboro
doctrine states "an individual's assertion of a right grounded in a collective-
bargaining agreement is recognized .... [T]he assertion of a right contained in a
collective-bargaining agreement is an extension of the concerted action that
produced the agreement. . . the assertion of such a right affects the rights of all
employees covered by the collective-bargaining agreement." Id. at 829 (citations
omitted).
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garbage truck were not functional and therefore that asking him to drive it
violated a provision of his collective bargaining agreement.23 The
foundation requirement is established because the supervisors had notice of
the faulty brakes because Brown had, over the period of two days,
complained about the brakes.24 Therefore, at the time that Brown actually
refused to drive the truck, the supervisor was aware of why Brown was
doing so. 25 The foundation requirement is met because Brown's refusal to
drive the garbage truck was anchored to his complaint, which the managers
were aware of before Brown engaged in the concerted activity-refusal to
drive the garbage truck.
Lastly, the foundation requirement is established when individual
concerted activity was based on union activity. In Eastex v. NLRB, the
Court held that individuals had a right to engage in union activity for the
mutual benefit of all employees.26 Hugh Terry, an employee of Eastex, Inc.,
repeatedly asked his superiors for permission to hand out copies of a union
27
newsletter. When permission was denied, the union filed an unfair
23 Id. at 824-25. The collective bargaining agreement stated:
The Employer shall not require employees to take out on the
streets or highways any vehicle that is not in safe operating
condition or equipped with safety appliances prescribed by law.
It shall not be a violation of this Agreement where employees
refuse to operate such equipment unless such refusal is
unjustified.
Id.; see also Monongahela Power Co. v. NLRB, Nos. 94-1905, 94-2036, 150
L.L.R.M. (BNA) 2192, *6-7 (4th Cir. Aug. 7, 1995) (finding that Bolyard's
arguments with management over the scope of the thirty-minute rule constituted
concerted activity within the meaning of the Act); NLRB v. P*I*E Nationwide,
Inc., 923 F.2d 506, 515 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Though incorrect, however, an
employee's understanding of the collective bargaining agreement may nevertheless
be reasonable . . .. [And therefore] concerted activity."); Snyder v. Dietz &
Watson, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 2d 428, 453 (D.N.J. 2011) ("[T]he NLRA protects
individual employees who invoke rights contained in a CBA because their activity
is a direct extension of the collective bargaining process." (citations omitted)).
24 City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 826-27.25 Id. In fact, Brown stated outright why he was not going to drive the truck:
"[T]here's something wrong with that truck .... [S]omething was wrong with the
brakes .. . there was a grease seal or something leaking causing it to be affecting
the brakes." Id. at 827.
26 See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567 (1978); see also Monongahela
Power Co., 150 L.L.R.M. (BNA) at *6 ("The Board reasonably found that
Bolyard's daily consultations with Union Steward Hairston regarding the
application of the 30-minute rule constituted union activity within the meaning of
the Act."); NLRB v. CER, Inc., 762 F.2d 482, 485-86 & n. 3 (5th Cir. 1985)
(section 7 protects the right of obtaining union assistance).
27 Eastex, 437 U.S. at 560.
2013 Callfor Consistency: A Proposed 7
Objective Framework for Defining
"Concerted Activity "for Facebook Posts
practice charge, alleging interference with employees' section 7 rights. 2 8
Though no other employees joined Terry, the Court held that the activity
was concerted under section 7.29 The foundation requirement was met in
this case because handing out pamphlets was anchored to a complaint made
in the physical world that the managers were aware of before the dispute
was brought to the Board. As these cases demonstrate, the foundation
requirement is well established. When an activity has been held to be
concerted, the inciting incident has always occurred before the concerted
activity.3 o
B. Substantive Requirement
The second implied factor necessary for identifying concerted activity
is whether the employee's activity reasonably relates to the common goal-
based on the anchor in the foundation requirement-of that activity.
Though this factor is not mentioned specifically by a decisionmaker, if the
activity that the employee engages in does not reasonably relate to the
anchor, then the activity is not concerted. The substantive requirement
ensures that the "spawning" notion of concerted activity" does not occur.
The court in NLRB v. Portland Airport Limousine Co. stated that a
subjective interpretation of concerted activity was "expressly rejected by
the Board in the Meyers cases in favor of the Board's present test, which
... asks whether there is any objective evidence" of an attempt to "band
together .. . in pursuit of a common goal."32 In other words, the substantive
requirement requires an examination of the activity and objective
determination of whether the activity relates to the anchor event.
28 Id. at 560-61.
29 Id. at 570.
30 Implementation of this requirement will be discussed infra Part V.
31 See Aroostook Cnty. Reg'l Ophthalmology Ctr. v. NLRB, 81 F.3d 209, 214
(D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[Blecause the employees were discussing vital elements of their
employment, such communications are protected by the NLRA because they could
'spawn collective action.' We neither understand nor endorse the Board's
'spawning' theory, which, on its face, appears limitless. . . ."). Such inferential
reasoning "finds no good support in the law." Id
3 2 NLRB v. Portland Airport Limousine Co., 163 F.3d 662, 667 (1st Cir. 1998); see
Reef Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 952 F.2d 830, 838 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Numerous cases
confirm that activities for 'mutual aid or protection' under NLRA § 7 are not
limited to either the employee's own employer-employee relationship or to
activities intended to change specific conditions or terms of employment. There
must, of course, be some nexus between the employees' concerted activities and
the employment relationship ... ." (footnote omitted)); see also E. Fredrick Preis,
Jr. & Gregory A. McConnell, Labor Law, 38 LoY. L. REv. 871, 889 (1992).
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In Washington Aluminum Co., the substantive requirement of concerted
activity was met because, objectively, the Board reasonably determined that
the walkout was related to the anchored event.33 The employees staged a
walkout during which they made sure that their employer knew exactly why
they were doing so: the frigid temperatures.34 From an objective viewpoint,
it could be reasonably determined that the walkout was because of the frigid
temperatures, therefore it satisfied the substantive requirement.
In Portland Airport Limousine Co., Wayne Speed, an employee truck
driver, was fired for refusing to drive a tractor due to safety reasons.s After
complaining of fumes to his operations manager, Speed had the truck
inspected by the employer's usual repair and maintenance provider (R &
R).36 R & R detected no fumes and stated that the truck was safe to
operate. Notwithstanding a subsequent inspection and determination by a
different maintenance operation that the tractor was safe to drive, Speed
still refused to drive the truck.38 Unlike in Washington Aluminum Co., in
this case there was no objective connection between refusing to drive the
truck and the common goal of employee safety. The substantive
requirement is not met here because a reasonable person would not believe
that the motivation for Speed's refusal to drive the truck was because of
safety concerns; the truck had been declared safe to drive on several
-39occasions.
Additionally, the substantive requirement exists in cases decided
according to the Board's "spawning theory,"40 which describes instances
where the court or Board raises theories of concerted activity that the
parties did not raise themselves. In Aroostook, four employees were
terminated for violating the office policy that outlined how grievances
should be handled.4 ' The employees' grievance concerned changes in the
work schedule; rather than address their concerns directly to their employer,
33 NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12 (1962) (referring to the instance
when Jarvis, the shop foreman, informed the general foreman that all but one
employee had left because of the temperatures in the shop).
34 Id.
35 PortlandAirport Limousine, 163 F.3d at 662.
3 Id. at 663.
3Id. at 662-64.
3 Id.
40 See Aroostook Cnty. Reg'1 Ophthalmology Ctr., 81 F.3d 209, 214 (D.C. Cir.
1996); see also Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transp., N.A., Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d
19, 28 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (criticizing the Board for attempting to find ambiguity in
policies); Philip J. Moss, Aroostook County Regional Ophthalmology Center v.
National Labor Relations Board: The NLRB's Attempt to Expand the Definition of
"Protected Concerted Activities" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 12 ME.
B.J. 68, 76 (1997).
41Aroostook, 81 F.3d. at 211.
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the employees "voiced their complaints within earshot of [Aroostook]
patients." 42 After being fired, the employees filed suit, stating that they had
the "right to seek the assistance of, among others, spouses, families or
friends on matters pertaining to their terms of employment."43 Looking
beyond the employee's complaint, the Board "spawned" the notion that the
physicians intended to say that talking to family members was "directly
linked to hours and conditions of work-both vital elements of
employment-and [was] as likely to spawn collective action as the
discussion of wages."" The court wisely rejected the Board's creation of
concerted activity-through the spawning theory-when the employees did
not raise the concerns that the Board, through inference, stated they did.45
Unless the activity that the employee engages in reasonably relates to the
anchor, then the substantive requirement is not met, and the activity is not
concerted.
C. Procedural Requirement
The last implied factor is met if the activity was conducted in a way
that affirmatively solicited the participation of another employee for the
purpose of mutual aid or protection. This requirement only comes into play
if the nature of the alleged concerted activity relates to an ongoing dispute.
Therefore, if the substantive requirement shows that the activity concerns
union activity or the enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement, then
the inquiry ends and the activity is deemed concerted.46 In the last instance,
however, where an employee's dispute substantively relates to an ongoing
dispute, the procedural requirement must be satisfied.
42 id
43 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 Id. at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted).
45 Id. at 214 (describing the Board's "spawning" theory as "on its face . .. limitless
and nonsensical"). The court also, hypothetically, stated that an argument could be
made that the activity was concerted by relating the scheduling changes to an
ongoing labor dispute. Id. Even if that were true, the court stated that the result
would be the same. Id
46 This is in line with the holdings of City Disposal because such individual action,
such as union activity or enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement, is
deemed to be concerted and the inquiry of "mutual aid or protection" is not needed
because such agreements "affect[] all the employees covered." See NLRB v. City
Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 830 (1984). Also note the text of 29 U.S.C. § 157
which, in pertinent part, states "[e]mployees shall have the right to ... engage in
... concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection." (emphasis added). National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (2006); see also El Gran Combo de P.R. v. NLRB, 853 F.2d 996, 1002 (1st
Cir. 1988) ("[R]easonable construction by the Board is entitled to considerable
deference.").
10 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 8.1
BUSINESS LAWJOURNAL
While this requirement does not necessitate magic words or a provide a
formulaic approach for gathering support, it does require some obviousness
that the activity is being done for the mutual aid and benefit of other
employees, rather than merely as a personal gripe.47 This requirement exists
on a continuum between the activity being done solely for personal
matters-where the Board has no jurisdiction 48 -to instances in which the
activity is truly done for mutual aid and protection. Another level of
complexity arises if the subject of a personal gripe is a "topic of group
concern"; such a gripe could be seen as being made for mutual aid and
protection.49 The solicitation needs to be quite explicit in order to pass this
requirement. Mere hinting at involvement will not be sufficient to pass this
portion of the test and be deemed concerted activity. 0
Not all activity that solicits a fellow employee's participation is done
for the purposes of mutual aid and protection. If the purpose was not for
mutual aid or protection, then action against the employee is not prohibited
under section 7." In Joanna Cotton Mills Co., the court noted that while the
employee, Blakely, did solicit help, it was done "without thought of mutual
aid or protection, and with no purpose other than to help [Blakely] get rid of
an unpopular second hand who had angered him."5 2
If an employee seeks the participation of other employees, but the
other employees denounce the employee's actions, this portion of the test
may not be satisfied. For instance, if other employees explicitly denounce
the actions of one employee, the actions of that employee will not be seen
as being done for mutual aid and protection.53 If the employee seeks to
47 See Rita Gail Smith & Richard A. Parr II, Note, Protection ofIndividual Action
As "Concerted Activity" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 68 CORNELL L.
REv. 369, 375 (1983).
48 City Disposal Sys., 465 U.S. at 842 n.2 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The Court
and the Board agree that the Act cannot be read to cover, or to give the Board
jurisdiction over, purely personal, though work-related, claims of individual
employees.").
49 Ewing v. NLRB, 861 F.2d 353, 361 (2d Cir. 1988); El Gran Combo de P.R., 853
F.2d at 1005 (excluding "mere talk" and "mere griping"); see also NLRB v. Caval
Tool Div., Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 262 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2001)
(stating that concerted activity "includes the actions of a single employee, acting
alone, who intends to initiate group activity").
50 City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. at 842 n.2 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
mere fact that an asserted right can be presumed to be of interest to other
employees is not a sufficient basis for labeling it 'concerted."' (emphasis added)).
51 See, e.g., Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 753 (4th Cir. 1949).
52 oanna Cotton Mills Co., 176 F.2d at 754.
5 Del E. Webb Realty & Mgmt. Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 593, 594 (1975); see also R.J.
Tower Iron Works, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 445 (1963) ("The complaints made by [the
employee] to his foreman appear to me to fall in the category dealt with by the
Board in this line of cases. In each instance, not only was [the] complaint purely
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induce group activity with his or her actions, it will be seen as an
affirmative solicitation.54 For an activity to qualify as concerted, "it must
appear at the very least that it was engaged in with the object of initiating or
inducing or preparing for group action or that it had some relation to group
action in the interest of the employees.""
The court in Washington Aluminum Co. confronted an ongoing
employee dispute; therefore, the activity, in order to be concerted, needed to
satisfy the third implied factor: the procedural requirement. The activity-
the walkout-had to have been done in a way that affirmatively solicited
the participation of other employees for the purposes of mutual aid or
protection or it would not meet the procedural requirement. Based upon the
facts of Washington Aluminum Co., the employees that engaged in the
walkout did so in a manner that affirmatively solicited the participation of
other employees for the purposes of mutual aid or protection.s6 The
"affirmative solicitation" and the "for the purposes of mutual aid or
protection" requirements were satisfied because an employee mentioned
"we had all got together and thought it would be a good idea to go home;
maybe we could get some heat brought into the plant that way."s7
personal and either trivial or completely unjustified but, as shown even by his own
testimony, his attitude and remarks were unreasonable and senselessly irritating to
the foreman.").
54 El Gran Combo de P.R., 853 F.2d at 1003; see Cormier v. Simplex Techs., Inc.,
No. 98-500, 1999 WL 628120, at *4 (D.N.H. Mar. 4, 1999) ("When employees act
together, they clearly satisfy the concerted activity requirement; courts, however,
have also found that individual actions can be 'concerted activity' in some
circumstances." (citations omitted)).
5 Mushroom Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964); see also E.I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Chestnut Run) v. NLRB, 733 F.2d 296, 299 (3d Cir.
1984) ("A request for the assistance of another employee is protected .... "
(citations omitted)); Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1347 (3d Cir.
1969) ("To protect concerted activities in full bloom, protection must necessarily
be extended to 'intended, contemplated or even referred to' group action . . .
(citations omitted)).
56 NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 11-13 (1962).
57 Id. at 12 (emphasis added). The emphasized portion, in fact, has the Court's basis
of analysis for all three key factors. Compare the affirmative language here to what
the Court in Mushroom Transportation required:
It is not questioned that a conversation may constitute a
concerted activity although it involves only a speaker and a
listener, but to qualify as such, it must appear at the very least
that it was engaged in with the object of initiating or inducing or
preparing for group action or that it had some relation to group
action in the interest of the employees.
Mushroom Transp. Co., 330 F.2d at 685.
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The court in El Gran Combo focused on what was necessary for an
employee to intend to induce group activity. In that case, the activities of
two employees were characterized as "repeated attempts to enlist the
support of the other combo members."58 That court noted that it was
immaterial to the Board if the actual solicitation resulted in a successful
joining together of employees.59 The proper focus of the analysis is whether
the employee "intended, contemplated, or even referred to" some type of
group action.60 The mutual aid or protection factor was also satisfied
because the activity was about wages, and wages affected all employees.6'
The procedural requirement is well established. In order for an activity
to be considered concerted, the activity must have been done in a way that
affirmatively solicited the participation of another employee for the purpose
of mutual aid or protection.6 2 The foundation, substantive and procedural
requirements have been consistently present throughout the analysis of
concerted activity. However, the Board has disregarded these three factors
when analyzing concerted activity in the realm of social media.
III. TAILORING THE HIDDEN FACTORS TO FIT FACEBOOK
To implement an objective approach, the substantive requirement and
the procedural requirement need to be modified because of the nature of
Facebook.63 Modification to substantive and procedural requirements is
necessary because Facebook lacks the face-to-face interaction between
employees that is assumed in situations where the concerted activity occurs
in a physical space, such as a work environment.
A. Modifying the Substantive Requirement for Facebook Posts
The substantive requirement must be tailored for an objective
interpretation. This comment calls for a four-corner approach to
interpretation. While group interaction might occur, an employee's initial
post or comment is what is to be used to determine whether the activity is
concerted. The Board currently uses a subjective view of what the
employee meant rather than what the employee actually said. The four-
58 El Gran Combo de P.R., 853 F.2d at 1005.
" Id. at 1004-05.
60 Id. at 1004 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
6 See id. at 1001; see also Cormier v. Simplex Techs., Inc., No. 98-500, 1999 WL
628120, at *5 (D.N.H. Mar. 4, 1999) ("[One employee] was clearly acting on
behalf of other employees, with their knowledge and consent.").
62 Implementation of this requirement will be discussed infra Part IV.
63 The foundation requirement will remain the same because it will serve as an
anchor to something that occurred in the physical world before an employee takes
to virtual world to air his or her concerns.
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corner approach is ideal for examining Facebook posts because the theory
behind the approach lends itself to objective interpretation.'6 The
substantive requirement's method is simple: trust the text.s
Imposing a fact-finder's interpretation on a social media post poses the
same danger as imposing unstated congressional intent on the text of a
statute; rather than following the expressed intentions of the drafter, it
allows decisionmakers to pursue their own "objectives and desires." 6 A
decision based on intent, which lacks a connection between what was said
and what was meant, is a decision based on what a "wise and intelligent
person should have meant; and that will surely bring [one] to the conclusion
that the . . . [post means] what [one] think[s] it ought to mean."67 Facebook
posts must be interpreted in an objective manner.
B. Modifying the Procedural Requirement for Facebook Posts
The procedural requirement needs to be tailored to focus on how the
Facebook post was made to determine if it was done in a way that
affirmatively solicited other employees for the purpose of mutual aid or
protection. Both components of the procedural requirement need to be
based on objective evidence: the first component requires an employee's
post to affirmatively solicit the participation of another employee; the
second demands the purpose of the post to be for mutual aid or protection.
Three methods exist for objectively soliciting the participation of
another employee: (1) the employee seeking to engage others can mention
them by name, (2) employees can be mentioned in general or (3) an
employee can post the activity on a fellow employee's Facebook "wall."68
6 See ANTONIN SCALIA, COMMON-LAW COURTS IN A CIVIL-LAw SYSTEM: THE
ROLE OF UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURTS IN INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3
1998).
5 See Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for
Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1663, 1663 (1991). Justice Scalia argues that
without stare decisis, consistent application of the law is in jeopardy. See SCALIA,
supra note 64, at 7. There are several groups that decide what concerted activity is,
and if they continue their subjective approach to interpreting a social media post, it
will lead to inconsistent application of the "law." The text should take precedent
over intent because it will lead to more uniform decisions. See id. at 38.
66 See SCALIA, supra note 64, at 17-18.
" Id. at 18.
68 Though not identified by name, the Board recognized these three factors in
Hispanics United. The post read: "Lydia Cruz, a coworker feels that we don't help
our clients enough at [Respondent] I about had it! My fellow coworkers how do u
feel?" Read objectively, this post affirmatively solicits participation because (1) the
post mentioned Cruz by name, (2) the post solicited the participation of employees
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An employee's subsequent post is irrelevant to the analysis.69 To
objectively determine whether the post is done for mutual aid or protection,
the content of the post will have to be examined. Mention of the anchored
activity is objective evidence that the post is being done for mutual aid or
protection. With the aforementioned modifications to the substantive and
procedural requirements, the objective framework can be applied to social
media cases.
IV. THREE-PART OBJECTIVE TEST FOR DETERMINING IF A FACEBOOK
POST IS CONCERTED ACTIVITY
This Part takes the three-part test presented in Part III and retrofits it to
four decisions handed down by the Board. To recap, the three requirements
for the objective test in the context of social media are the foundation
requirement, the substantive requirement and the procedural requirement.
The foundation requirement will be satisfied if there has been a clearly
communicated concern to someone in power before the social media post
occurred. The substantive requirement will be satisfied if the common goal
that the activity purports can be reasonably determined from the contents of
the social media post. If the post does not concern union activity or a
collective bargaining agreement, the procedural requirement must be
satisfied as well. The procedural requirement will be satisfied if, by
objective standards, the social media post was made in a way that
affirmatively solicited the participation of another employee for the purpose
of mutual aid or protection.
A. Bay Sys Technologies: Objective Test and Board Reach the Same
Outcome for the Same Reasons
In this case, the three-part objective test and the Board come to the
same conclusion, through the same reasoning, that the Facebook post of
Bay Sys employee Dontray Tull was concerted activity. This result shows
in general and (3) it was posted on another employee's wall. See Hispanics United
of Buffalo, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012 WL 6800769, at *4 (Dec. 14, 2012)
(alteration in original); see infra Part IV.A.
69 See Rick Ross, NLRB Issues New Reports on Social Media, EMPLOYER L.
UPDATE (Feb. 3, 2012), http://employerlawupdate.com/nlrb-issues-new-report-on-
social-media/ ("When co-workers are silent, the employee's posts are often not
protected."). Focusing on subsequent communication goes against what is clearly
established-hence the procedural requirement-that the focus should be on the
attempt, not the actual success of that attempt. See El Gran Combo de P.R. v.
NLRB, 853 F.2d 996, 1005 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v.
NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345, 1348 (3d Cir. 1969) ("[A] single employee attempting to
induce fellow workers to join in a petition regarding a common grievance is
protected." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
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that the Board does not need to rely on subjective interpretation when
objective evidence is sufficient to reach the same conclusion. Bay Sys
tasked the Board with deciding whether Tull's Facebook post was
concerted activity and would, therefore, make Tull's subsequent firing a
violation of section 8.70 The employer learned of the Facebook post when
the Eastern Shore Post, a local newspaper, published the conversation that
Tull initiated.7' The Board held that the Facebook post was concerted
activity because the employer had notice of the employees' complaints
about not receiving timely paychecks.n The Board further stated that the
purpose of engaging in the Facebook conversation was for mutual aid and
protection since the timely issuance of paychecks affected all Bay Sys
employees.7 3 For similar reasons, the decision is the same under the three-
part objective inquiry.
1. Foundation Requirement
Tull's Facebook post satisfies the foundation requirement because Bay
Sys was well aware of the employees' discontent with not receiving their
paychecks in a timely manner. The numerous instances in which the
employer did not pay employees on time was the anchor incident.74 The
employer, represented by the CEO, was well aware of the issue: before the
Facebook post occurred, there was a press release sent out to the
employees, stating that they would be paid within two days.7 ' This evidence
is sufficient to establish the foundation requirement.
2. Substantive Requirement
Tull's Facebook post satisfies the substantive requirement because,
objectively, the post reasonably relates to the anchor event. The Facebook
post stated: "Hopefully, next week starts off right with a paycheck or
management gonna be installing cabinet themselves."76 Judging by the
content of the post itself, a reasonable person can easily deduce that the
subject is about the receipt of paychecks.n
70 Bay Sys Techs., LLC, 357 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 2011 WL 3318495, at *1 (Aug. 2,
2011).
7' See id. at *2. The news story is still available. Linda Cicoira, Despite Claims of
Financial Stability, BaySys Couldn't Make Payroll, E. SHORE POST, Aug. 13, 2010,
at 1.
72 See Cicoira, supra note 71.
73 See Bay Sys Techs., 357 N.L.R.B. at *1.
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3. Procedural Requirement
Tull's Facebook post satisfies the procedural requirement because the
post was made in a way that affirmatively solicited the participation of
another employee for the purpose of mutual aid or protection. The
substantive requirement shows that this requirement will need to be met
because the subject of the post is not about union activity or the
enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement, but rather an ongoing
dispute-not receiving paychecks on time.
The two parts of the procedural requirement are met here. First, the
method by which Tull shared the information is critical; Tull did not post
the Facebook message on his own page-which would not be an
affirmative solicitation-but rather posted on the page of another co-
worker.18 This is sufficient to establish the affirmative solicitation
requirement. Additionally, the post must have been made for the purpose of
mutual aid or protection. From the contents of the post, there is nothing that
suggests that it was merely a personal situation, since the analysis of the
foundation requirement showed that this issue-not receiving paychecks in
a timely fashion-affected all of the employees, not just Tull. Therefore,
the post satisfies the procedural requirement as well.
Since all three prongs of the objective test are satisfied, Tull's
Facebook post is indeed concerted activity. This result shows that if the
objective evidence shows that the activity is concerted, the Board will not
need to supply its own shifting, subjective interpretation.
B. Hispanics United of Buffalo: The Objective Test and the Board
Reach Different Outcomes
The three-part objective test and the Board reached different
conclusions in Hispanics United because the Board disregarded the
foundation requirement. The Board examined the activity of five employees
who were terminated by Hispanics United of Buffalo (HUB) based on their
Facebook conversations critical of another employee. 79 Though the first post
was that of Mariana Cole-Rivera, four other employees were terminated for
the whole engagement.80 HUB was not aware of any issue whatsoever; the
first occasion on which the employer heard about the concern was in the
7 Molly DiBianca, NLRB and Facebook Firings: Employer's Worst-Case
Scenario, DEL. EMP'T L. BLOG (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.delawareemployment
lawblog.com/2011/08/nlrb-and-facebook-firings-empl.html ("On August 6, 2010,
Mr. Tull posted comments to other employees' Facebook pages about the
employer's failure to issue employees' paychecks on time.").
79 Hispanics United of Buffalo, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2012 WL 6800769, at *1-2
(Dec. 14, 2012).80 Id.
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Facebook post.81 In holding that the Facebook posts were concerted, the
Board ignored the foundation requirement. The primary reason why the
objective test does not consider Cole-Rivera's Facebook post to be
concerted activity is because the foundation requirement was not met: there
was no anchor in the physical world before the post was made. For a
complete analysis, all three portions of the objective test will be examined.
1. Foundation Requirement
Cole-Rivera's Facebook post does not pass the foundation requirement
because HUB was not aware of any issues before the post was made.
Without an anchor event, Cole-Rivera's post fails this requirement. In its
opinion, the Board stated that it was irrelevant that the employer was not
aware of the grievances.82 In coming to this incorrect decision, the Board
misread the facts of Aroostook.83 Not only was the Board's determination in
Aroostook overturned by the D.C. Circuit,8 4 but the facts show that the
employer was well aware of the employee's behavior before he or she
engaged in the activity and that the employee was terminated because his
"conduct on May 28 . . . was the last straw."85 Additionally, stating that the
employer does not need to be aware of the concerns is a misreading of
precedent.
Cruz-Moore only mentioned an intention to meet with her supervisor to
discuss the job performance of another employee.8 ' This never happened
before the Facebook post. Because there is no anchor event, which would
be a discussion that would raise awareness to HUB, the foundation
requirement is not met.
2. Substantive Requirement
If there were an anchor event, the substantive requirement would be
met because the post objectively reflects a concern that HUB is not doing
enough to help employees. Mentioned earlier, the Facebook post said:
81 See id. at *2.
82 Id. at * 13 ("It is irrelevant to this case that the discriminatees ... did not
communicate their concerns to Respondent.").
83 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
8 Aroostook Cnty. Reg'1 Ophthalmology Ctr. v. NLRB, 81 F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir.
1996). The Administrative Law Judge should not have relied on Aroostook because
the employees were fired for violating an office policy, not because they were
discussing their hours. See id. at 214-15.
8 Aroostook Cnty. Reg'1 Ophthalmology Ctr., 317 N.L.R.B. 218, 219 (1995)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
86 See supra Part II.A.
87 Hispanics United ofBuffalo, 2012 WL 6800769, at *1.
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"Lydia Cruz, a coworker feels that we don't help our clients enough at
HUB. I about had it! My fellow coworkers how do u feel?"88 Judging by the
contents of the Facebook post, it can be reasonably determined that it
concerns the fact that HUB is not doing enough.
3. Procedural Requirement
Cole-Rivera's Facebook post satisfies the procedural requirement
because it was made in a way that affirmatively solicited the participation
of another employee for the purpose of mutual aid or protection. This
requirement must be met because the employee's concern does not involve
a collective bargaining agreement or union activity, but rather related an
ongoing dispute over job performance.
The post satisfies both components of the procedural requirement. First,
Cole-Rivera mentioned both another employee and employees in general in
the Facebook post.89 Additionally, the post was made so that all employees
could better assist individuals that need the services of HUB. 90
The differences in outcome in this situation show why timing is
important for the foundation requirement. The foundation requirement
ensures that the employer is not blind-sided by employees. Especially in the
realm of social media, the foundation requirement is necessary so that peace
can be maintained in the workplace and the employer-even if he or she
does not do so-at least has the opportunity to address the issue before
workplace issues are aired publicly.
C. American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc.: The Objective
Test and the Board Reach Diferent Outcomes
The three-part objective test and the Board, by virtue of the General
Counsel, reach different conclusions in American Medical Response of
Connecticut because the Board based its decision on subjective factors.
Conversely, under the objective test, the employee's social media post
failed the objective test primarily because of the substantive requirement. In
American Medical Response of Connecticut, the General Counsel examined
the activity of Dawnmarie Souza to determine if her termination for a
Facebook post was concerted activity. 91 American Medical Response
(American) fired Souza after she made crude Facebook posts about her
88 Id.
89 See id.
90 See id ("[E]mployees ... did not provide timely and adequate assistance to
clients.").
91 See American Medical Advice Memorandum, supra note 7, at 3.
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supervisor.92 In holding that her actions were concerted,93 the General
Counsel stated that because Souza was discussing supervisory actions with
workers in her Facebook post, the activity was protected. 94 The General
Counsel focused on subsequent Facebook posts and said that the intent of
the text was clearly related to the supervisor's actions. The primary reason
why the objective test does not consider Souza's Facebook post concerted
activity is because there is no indication of the anchor activity in the
Facebook post, therefore failing the substantive requirement. Additionally,
the post failed the procedural requirement. For a complete analysis, Souza's
Facebook post will be examined under each part of the objective test.
1. Foundation Requirement
Souza's Facebook post passes the foundation requirement because she
clearly communicated her desire to have her supervisor present during an
initial meeting before she made the Facebook post.96 Souza communicated
this concern to her supervisor to no avail.97 The fact that the supervisor
knew that Souza wanted a union representative before she posted on
Facebook is sufficient evidence to satisfy the foundation requirement.
92 Id. at 4.
A finding of "protected" status, although outside the scope of this comment, was
an absurd result in itself. See Aroostook Cnty. Reg'l Ophthalmology Ctr. v. NLRB,
81 F.3d 209, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("The fact that an activity is concerted does not
necessarily mean that an employee can engage in the activity with impunity.");
NLRB v. Mike Yurosek & Son, Inc., 53 F.3d 261, 266 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting a
distinction between protected concerted activity and unprotected concerted
activity). It was found that Souza's Facebook post, notwithstanding calling her
employer derogatory terms, was not done with impunity. See American Medical
Advice Memorandum, supra note 7, at 9-10.
94 American Medical Advice Memorandum, supra note 7, at 9.
95 See id. Even if that were the case, judging by what the General Counsel read, it is
a stretch to say the conversation was about the actions of a supervisor. The General
Counsel noted the conversation as follows:
An AMR supervisor then responded, "What happened?," and a
current AMR employee posted, "What now?" Souza answered,
"Frank being a dick." A former AMR employee next wrote "I'm
so glad I left there," and the current AMR employee stated,
"Ohhh, he's back, huh?" Souza replied, "Yep he's a scumbag as
usual." The thread ended with the current AMR employee telling
Souza to "[c]hin up!"
Id. at 3-4 (alteration in original). The only reference here is to her supervisor as
male genitalia and as a scumbag. This is not what the drafters of the NLRA
intended "concerted activity" to mean.
96 See id. at 3.
97 d
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2. Substantive Requirement
Souza's Facebook post does not pass the substantive requirement
because there is no objective evidence that mentions the anchor event. The
contents of the Facebook posts were as follows: "[i]ooks like I'm getting
some time off. Love how the company allows a 17 [AMR code for a
psychiatric patient] to be supervisor." 98 The subject of this post contains no
reasonable relation to what satisfied the foundation requirement-the
supervisor's refusal to let her have union representation while drafting an
incident report. Since it cannot be reasonably discerned from the Facebook
post that Souza is referring to union activity or a collective bargaining
agreement, it could be said that it relates to an ongoing dispute regarding
the actions of her supervisor. However, this argument fails because no facts
exist in the record to show that Souza had any issue beyond the denied
union representation-which would mean any incident mentioned in the
Facebook post that does not relate to the anchored event would fail the
foundation requirement. Since there is no objective evidence that Souza's
Facebook post referred to the anchor event, the post fails the substantive
requirement.
3. Procedural Requirement
Since Souza's action concerned union activity, this requirement does
not need to be satisfied.99 However, if the substantive requirement in
Souza's case had been met, this test would have to be satisfied. 00 Souza
posted the message on her own Facebook wall,'o' which is prima facie
evidence that there was no affirmative solicitation of others. Additionally,
there is no indication from the language of the post that Souza was seeking
to induce group activity. The post also resembles a personal gripe more so
than a statement made for mutual benefit or protection. Since Souza's post
related to a personal, isolated incident and did no more than express her
frustration with her supervisor, it does not satisfy the procedural
requirement.
Because the contents of Souza's Facebook post contain no reasonable
reference to her being denied union representation when filing her incident
report, it cannot be concerted activity under the objective framework. This
analysis is preferred over the General Counsel's subjective approach
because of the inferential-and judicially rejectedl 02 -"spawning theory"
that the General Counsel used to hold that the Facebook post referred to
98 id
99 See supra Part II.C.
101 See American Medical Advice Memorandum, supra note 7, at 3.
102 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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Souza's earlier meeting. 0 3 Such a subjective analysis is inconsistent and
offers little guidance to employers, employees and their counsel, as the
result of the case will depend on whom is deciding the case.
D. Karl Knauz Motors: The Objective Test and the Board Reach
Different Outcomes
In Karl Knauz Motors, the three-part objective test and the Board come
to the different conclusions because the Board-by virtue of the
Administrative Law Judge-ignores the procedural requirement when
holding that Karl Knauz Motor employee Robert Becker's Facebook post
was concerted activity. Becker was terminated after he posted criticisms
about the food choices that were to be provided at an annual Ultimate
Driving Event.'05 In holding that the activity was concerted, the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) stated that the Facebook post related to an
issue that could have had an effect on the compensation of all employees.' 0 6
Based on the three-part objective test, however, Becker's Facebook post
was not concerted activity primarily because it failed the procedural
requirement.
1. Foundation Requirement
The foundation requirement is met because, before Becker posted on
Facebook, there was an ongoing dispute of which the employer was aware.
The Facebook post was made on June 14, 2010.107 The discussions of the
food options occurred, according to Becker, around June 7 or 8, one or two
days before the actual Ultimate Driving Event. 08 The discussions revolved
around some of the employees' discontent with the quality of the food
options for the event.'09 The dates are relevant for the foundation
103 See American Medial Advice Memorandum, supra note 7, at 6, 9-10.
'0 See supra Part III.A.
105 Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437, at *2 (Sept. 28,
2012).
106 Id. at *8.
107 Id. at *4.
108 Id. at *2.
109 Id. Some employees "rolled their eyes in amazement" when they heard about
the food options. Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). The employer replied
with "[t]his is not a food event." Id. The ALJ held the activities as concerted based
on the following analysis:
While it is not as obvious a situation as if he had objected to the
Respondent reducing their wages or other benefits, there may
have been some customers who were turned off by the food
offerings at the event and either did not purchase a car because of
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requirement because the concern was communicated to the employer before
the Facebook post was made. The foundation requirement is satisfied here
because, before the social media occurred, there is a clearly communicated
concern to the employer.
2. Substantive Requirement
Becker's Facebook post satisfies the substantive requirement because,
objectively, it reasonably relates to the anchor event. The Facebook post
read as follows:
I was happy to see that Knauz went "All Out" for the most
important launch of a new BMW in years .. . the new 5
series. A car that will generate tens in millions of dollars in
revenues for Knauz over the next few years. The small 8 oz
bags of chips, and the $2.00 cookie plate from Sam's Club,
and the semi fresh apples and oranges were such a nice
touch . .. but to top it all off . . . the Hot Dog Cart. Where
our clients could attain a over cooked wiener and a stale
bunn . ... o
The post contains objective indications regarding the anchor event; it
mentions the anchor event directly."' The substantive requirement was met
because by objective standards, it is understood that the Facebook post
relates to the anchor event-the dispute of the type of food at the Ultimate
Driving Event.
3. Procedural Requirement
In contrast to what the ALJ held, Becker's Facebook post does not
satisfy the procedural requirement because the post was neither made in a
way that affirmatively solicited the participation of another employee, nor
for the purpose of mutual aid or protection. This part of the test must be
satisfied because the substantive requirement reveals that the issue was not
about union activity or a collective bargaining agreement, but rather an
ongoing dispute about food options.
it, or gave the salesperson a lowering rating in the Customer
Satisfaction Rating because of it; not likely, but possible.
Id. at *8 (emphasis added). The ALJ admits that this scenario, which heaps
inference upon inference, is not likely. See id. Interestingly enough, there was no
mention of food in any of the advertisements to the potential customers. Id. at *3.
This supports the employer's assertion that the choice of refreshments at the Event
did not matter, since customers were likely not drawn to the event by food.
0 Id. at *3.
' Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., No. 13-CA-46452, 2011 WL 4499437, at *3 (Sept. 28,
2012).
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Becker's post fails this requirement because it contains no indication
that other employees should be involved, nor does it mention another
employee by name.1 12 Additionally, the statement was posted on the
personal Facebook profile of the employee with the complaint, not that of
another employee. Furthermore, there is no indication that Becker posted on
his Facebook page seeking mutual aid or protection. To the contrary,
Becker's post appears to be a personal gripe or criticism of the situation.
For those reasons, this social media post does not satisfy the procedural
requirement.
The ALJ used multiple layers of inferences to determine that the
Facebook post was a product of mutual aid or protection of
compensation.113 In addition, the ALJ ignored the affirmative solicitation
requirement by relying entirely on mutual aid or protection rather than
looking for an attempt by Becker to join employees together in a common
cause. 1 14 Because Becker's post neither contained evidence of a plea for
mutual aid or protection, nor was made in a way that affirmatively solicited
the participation of another employee, it does not satisfy the procedural
requirement and is not concerted activity under the objective test.
The ALJ held that the post was concerted activity because of its
subjective interpretation of the facts. This example highlights the need of an
objective framework because the inference-upon-inference analysis could
change based on the decisionmaker. The objective framework will lead to a
consistent outcome no matter who is deciding the case. As the above
discussion demonstrates, if a social media post is examined through a
subjective lens, the results are unpredictable and unhelpful as guidance to
those facing similar issues. The Board must use the objective framework to
reach consistent decisions in the realm of social media.
V. CONCLUSION
The NLRB will continue to struggle to decide whether a Facebook post
should deserve section 7 protection. In making those determinations, the
Board must balance the interest of protecting an employee's right to engage
in concerted activities with the employer's right to discipline insubordinate
workers. The suggested objective framework discussed herein will allow
Facebook posts to be considered concerted activity if they satisfy the
foundation requirement, the substantive requirement and the procedural
requirement. Since such framework will lead to consistent decisions, both
112 id
" Id. at *8.
114 id
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small and large businesses can safely rely on this framework when making
employment decisions and establishing their social media policies.
Until that happens, however, employers should pause before taking any
adverse action against employees for their social media activity. Despite the
current inconsistent evaluation of "Facebook firings," employers must
consider several factors when deciding if disciplinary actions are lawful:
first, whether the employee's post relates to workplace conditions or the
terms of his or her employment; second, whether co-workers are
responding to or even aware of the posted complaint; and finally, whether
the post was following up or responding to something that happened to a
group at work. If any of these factors are present, employers should seek
experienced legal counsel before taking any action that could invoke
section 7 protection.
Additionally, employees should be aware that not all of their social
media activity is concerted activity. Though the Board's decisions are
generally inconsistent when it comes to labeling such activity as concerted,
many such instances do not qualify for protection under the NLRA.
Employees must take the Board's unpredictable rulings into consideration
before venting frustrations on social media and exercise caution when
publicly expressing discontent. Employees should also be aware of their
specific employer's social media policies, as not all policies that are posted
throughout the workplace or distributed during orientation improperly limit
an employee's section 7 rights.
Employers have an interest in protecting their reputation. Disparaging
social media postings are adverse to that interest. The Board will continue
to analyze complicated scenarios where employees share their workplace
issues on a worldwide forum. Until the dust settles and concerted activity
status is evaluated based on objective factors, however, employers and
employees alike should pause before taking action.
